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F ARM PRODUCTION has 
outpaced demand for some 
time. As a result, we've accumu-
lated extensive surpluses under 
government loan and storage. 
These surplus stocks and their 
costs are the symptoms of an im-
portant national problem. The 
public is becoming more and 
more concerned about the size of 
the stocks and the cost of carry-
ing them. Pressure is increasing 
to do something about both. 
Some people believe that the 
stocks themselves are depressing 
farm prices and are the heart of 
the farm problem. In other words, 
why not get rid of the stocks and 
solve the problem? 
"Payments-in-kind" are being 
discussed as one method of doing 
this. Generally payments-in-kind 
refer to paying farmers in bushels 
of corn or wheat, rather than 
money, for taking land out of pro-
duction or for complying with 
other possible government farm 
programs. "Use the surplus to 
eliminate the surplus," or, "Pay 
the farmers in unneeded grain in-
stead of cash." 
What Purpose? Why are pay-
ments-in-kind so appealing? Prob-
ably because they appear to off er 
a way to accomplish several goals 
that might be attained with a 
change in farm programs. ( 1) 
Stop building up surpluses. ( 2) 
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Reduce stocks by using them for 
something. ( 3) Maintain farm 
prices at a "satisfactory" level. 
( 4) Maintain food prices at a 
"satisfactory" level. ( 5) Accom-
plish these goals at a minimum 
treasury cost. 
There are other goals, too-con-
servation of resources, economic 
growth, freedom for farmers, jus-
tice, equity and many others. It 
isn't possible to say what goals 
the public deems most important 
or how much of one the public is 
willing to give up to accomplish 
another. 
Still, the attractiveness of the 
payments-in-kind approach prob-
ably has its base in the possibility 
of being able to accomplish sev-
eral goals at the same time. To 
more accurately gauge the effec-
tiveness of such an approach, let's 
consider first the surplus stocks 
and then how a payments-in-kind 
program might work. 
About the Stocks: The stocks 
themselves have done very little 
to depress farm prices. From 
another study at Iowa State, 
Geoffrey Shepherd concluded, 
"For feed grains as a whole, the 
effect of withholding CCC stocks 
appears to be as great as if the 
CCC stocks were removed from 
the market." The stocks are of 
little concern to the daily market 
so long as they aren't fed back 
into the market. 
If we got rid of all surplus 
stocks and only all current pro-
duction were to flow onto the mar-
ket, price improvement wouldn't 
come about. The government 
stocks-withdrawn and immobi-
lized from the market-aren't the 
major depressing force on prices. 
The depressing force is the supply 
that's still free on the market. 
Even with the stocks gone, annual 
production can still give a market 
supply greater than the amount 
that has been free on the market 
in recent years. 
Reduce Supply? Under some 
circumstances, payments-in-kind 
could increase the supply on the 
market and thus act to further 
depress market prices. That is, 
they could cut down surplus 
stocks without depressing market 
prices only if the supply-manage-
ment or production-control parts 
of the program were effective 
enough to "make room" for the 
additional supply. There would 
be "room" for the additional sup-
ply at present market prices only 
if current production were cut as 
much as the amount released 
from storage in "grain payments" 
plus the amount that has recently 
been going mto storage. Pay-
ments-in-kind could cut down sur-
plus stocks and improve market 
prices only if production were cut 
more than the amount released 
from storage and more than the 
amount that has recently been 
going into storage. 
Let's look at some ex:amples. 
Say that normal-weather grain 
production expected for next year 
is 200 million tons with no produc-
tion control. A payments-in-kind 
program might release 10 million 
tons of stored grain. If the coun-
teracting production control were 
not successful and 200 million 
tons still were produced, then the 
net effect would be the same as if 
we produced 210 million tons and 
put them on the market. If cur-
rent production were cut 5, 7 or 
even 9 million tons, the situation 
still would be similar. 
Prices would be lower than with 
no controls, no supports and con-
stant stocks whenever production 
wasn~t reduced enough to coun-
teract the amount released as 
payments-in-kind. Full average-
weather production would clear 
the market only at prices below 
present levels. And wi-t:h no pro-
duction control but payments-in-
kind, prices would be still lower. 
3-619 
Say the control program re-
duced over-all production the full 
10 million tons. Then 10 million 
tons could be released from stor-
age without depressing market 
prices below the "no supports-no 
controls" level with constant 
stocks. Thus, payments-in-kind 
on a bushel-for-bushel basis- giv-
ing a farmer 1 bushel for each 
bushel he cut production below 
normal - would reduce stocks. 
But it would have no effect in im-
proving prices above the "no sup-
ports-no controls" level. 
Say the control program re-
duced over-all production more 
than 10 million tons. Then prices 
would be higher than the "no sup-
ports-no controls" level. How ef-
fective would the control pro-
grams have had to be to maintain 
the prices which existed in 1959 
and 1960? An output-manage-
ment program using 10 million 
tons of payments-in-kind would 
have had to reduce over-all grain 
production an average of 26 mil-
lion tons each year in 19 5 8 and 
1959 to maintain 1959-60 grain 
and livestock prices. 
Probably, no supply-control 
program would be designed to get 
less than 1 bushel of control for 
each bushel paid in kind. Could 
it be designed and administered to 
get as much as 2 6 bushels of pro-
duction control for each 10 bush-
els paid in kind? Perhaps, but 
supply-control programs often fall 
short of their goals. While corn 
production, for instance, is being 
reduced, grain sorghum may be 
increasing. Or, production may 
drop in one state and increase in 
another. One farmer may cut his 
output while his neighbor in-
creases. Acreage may be reduced, 
but yield per acre may increase. 
Favorable weather may result in 
production exceeding normal ex-
pectations. Any of these would 
mean no room on the market for 
grain released as payments-in-
kind without depressing prices be-
yond goals. 
How Effective? How much 
theoretical production control 
might a bushel of grain buy? 
Theoretically it might buy more 
than a bushel. It shouldn't be nec-
essary to pay a producer the full 
anticipated value of his crop to 
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induce him not to grow it. This 
is because growing the crop in-
volves direct out-of-pocket costs. 
If the crop isn't grown, these 
costs can be saved. Most farmers 
would be induced to cut produc-
tion if the payment for not grow-
ing a crop were equal to normal 
yield times price, less out-of-
pocket costs. 
It might be possible on this 
basis, say, for 1 bushel of pay-
ment-in-kind to buy 10 bushels 
of production control. This might 
be the case on marginal land, if 
hired help and custom machinery 
were used. There the expected 
value of the crop would be low 
and uncertain, and almost all 
costs could be saved if the crop 
weren 't grown. On a typical fam-
ily farm in the Corn Belt, on the 
other hand, direct out-of-pocket 
costs are a small proportion of the 
total value of the crop. If we con-
sider investment, machinery and 
family labor as fixed costs, few 
savings could be made even if the 
crop weren't grown. In this case, 
1 bushel of payment-in-kind might 
"buy" something nearer 1,% -2 
bushels of expected production. 
How efficient is grain, com-
pared with cash, as a way of pay-
ing for voluntary participation in 
a supply-control program? Prob-
ably not as efficient. Given a 
choice between a check and an 
amount of grain of the same value , 
most people would choose cash. 
Then they wouldn't have to con-
vert part or all of the grain to 
cash to buy the things they need. 
Offered an amount of grain of 
more value than the check, they 
might more readily accept the 
grain and take the trouble of con-
verting it into cash. But it could 
certainly require at least as much, 
if not more, value in grain as cash 
to buy a given volume of produc-
tion control. 
We can't ignore the fact that 
grain is more expensive to trans-
port and deliver than a check if 
the grain is to be delivered as a 
check would be. And the volume 
of grain, presumably, would have 
to be measured exactly. A certifi-
cate might be given- perhaps re-
deemable in cash or grain. This 
would be...-a form of check but 
woulcf fn-troduce another means of 
exchange and more bookkeeping. 
So payments-in-kind might not 
be the least-cost way of liquidat-
ing government stocks. It might 
be cheaper for the government to 
sell the stocks on the market and 
use the proceeds to make money 
payments to farmers. 
Stabilize Prices? It was pos-
sible to stabilize grain prices from 
years of small crops to years of 
large crops by varying the rate 
at which stocks were built up. Re-
leasing stocks at a variable rate 
in an optional payments-in-kind 
program could be used to stabilize 
prices under a supply-control pro-
gram. That is, the rate at which 
stocks were released could be 
varied to offset variations in pro-
duction or demand and thus stabi-
lize prices. 
The government currently re-
leases some grain from stocks 
each year. In the last 8 years, 
however, this has been more than 
offset by additions to stocks. The 
amount released each year is con-
verted into money in the market. 
Payments-in-kind would use the 
grain directly for payments rather 
than use cash for distributing the 
value to farmers. But the effect 
on the supply and the price of 
grain would be the same whether 
the grain is converted to money 
in the market and the money sent 
to farmers or the grain distributed 
to farmers directly. 
Summing up: We could dispose 
of all our surpluses with pay-
ments-in-kind. Optional pay-
ments-in-kind could be used to 
stabilize prices under a supply-
management program. However, 
liquidation of the stocks wouldn't 
necessarily raise prices. 
To improve market prices, any 
payments-in-kind programs must 
be coupled with an output-man-
agement program effective enough 
to accomplish at least three 
things: ( 1) a sufficient reduction 
in current output to offset the 
stocks released by payments-in-
kind, (2) an additional reduction 
in current output the size of the 
past annual additions to stocks, 
( 3) still another cut in current 
output which would reduce the 
total supply per person below 
what it has been in the last few 
years. 
